

COMMENT ON KHRUSHCHEV'S DENUNCIATION OF STALIN

Preliminary Report

ENGLAND

The Times
June 5 1956

THE TEXT

Have we, at last, got an authentic text of MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S famous speech denouncing STALIN? The State Department admits that it cannot be quite sure. Nor can it say precisely how or where the text which it issued yesterday came into its hands. The source was "confidential," as it was bound to be. Yet there is some external evidence to suggest that the text is, at any rate, very near the truth. Apparently it came from a copy sent to a Communist Party outside Russia. In support of this it has been known for some time that copies were, in fact, sent to several Communist headquarters in Europe and elsewhere. And the State Department text is in line with party members' guarded comments on what their own text contained, both positively and negatively. The substance is repeated; and some passages in the first versions published in the west which Communists privately said at the time were incorrect do not appear in the Washington version. Finally, the new text is in MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S idiom.

Many have wondered why Moscow has not issued its own text of a speech that has been so much discussed across the world. It may do so now, but hitherto the explanation has been that the speech made disclosures of a state of affairs which the Soviet leaders may publicly and officially denounce in general terms, but of which they are ashamed. After all, they lived under STALIN. They joined in the adulations of the demigod. They now say that they lived in fear of their lives. Even so, to issue a full official text of MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S detailed account of the Stalin terror would mean portraying themselves in the most unflattering and

unheroic light. Possibly they are waiting to give to the world a fuller and rounder picture of the Stalin era and their part in it.

The immediate question is why MR. KHRUSHCHEV spoke as violently as he did. There are three main answers. First, the nature of the Stalin tyranny, in all its ruthlessness, was known to most of the Russian people, except the very young and the invincibly ignorant and fanatic. If his successors were to make a new start, they had to let it be known that they, too, saw STALIN as the tyrant. Workers in Russia were, in fact, given the gist of MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S denunciation soon after it was made. Secondly, so long as the Stalin myth continued, with him left on a pedestal as the man who decided all things—even the terrible things as well as the undoubted works of construction—his successors would appear as lesser men. Thirdly, and most important of all, MR. KHRUSHCHEV deliberately set out to show the evils unleashed when one man gains unbridled control of the life and death of millions. He himself explicitly draws the lesson: "We must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all." Probably the new leaders were partly forced into "collective leadership" through mutual security. Even after the fall of BERIA (supreme over the secret police) there were latent rivalries, some relying directly on the party organization, some more on the army; and they feared that a direct claim for supreme leadership by any one of them would precipitate a clash. The exposure of the Stalin tyranny is used as a warning to them all. Yet, in spite of recent relaxations, much remains to be done in altering the structure of the State to substantiate their present claims.

The Times
June 7 1956

THE OMISSIONS OF MR. KHRUSHCHEV

MANY REFORMS STILL NEEDED

FROM OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

The Foreign Office has been reluctant to comment on the version of Mr. Khrushchev's speech denouncing Stalin which was made public on Monday by the State Department in Washington, but it may be assumed that neither the British nor the American Government has any reason to doubt its authenticity, though it may not be complete.

It is believed to have been sent from Moscow to the headquarters of some Communist parties outside Russia—but not, according to the British Communist headquarters, to London. The main theme of most observers has seemed to be thankfulness at the repudiation of the Stalin era, but many were also pointing out certain omissions in the denunciation. Mr. Khrushchev denounced the mass deportations of certain Caucasian nationals in 1943-44, but there was apparently no reference to the deportations by the N.K.V.D. from the east of Poland in the summer of 1941 after its occupation by Soviet troops; and mention of the pre-war and post-war deportations from the Baltic States seems also to have been omitted. General Serov, who was in charge, evidently remains in favour under the present leadership. There seems to have been an agreement not to attack Stalin's policy too hard at points where present leaders are themselves directly implicated.

STALIN'S SECRETARY

Mr. Khrushchev seemed to excuse rather than to justify the present leaders for their conduct under Stalin. He said that some seven-tenths of the central committee of 1934 were arrested and shot. One of them, Kossior, who was liquidated in 1938, was Mr. Khrushchev's immediate predecessor as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Kossior, with Postyshev, had previously liquidated Skrypnik, who fell, as is now made clear, because of his opposition to Stalin. Evidently it was those who put up the stoutest resistance who went to the wall.

Although Mr. Khrushchev spoke bitterly and most revealingly of many dark incidents under the Stalin régime and thereby denounced the cruelty of his methods, he spoke with biting sarcasm of Poskrebyshev, Stalin's personal secretary, who may well have deserved anything said, but whose fate is totally unknown. He has not been heard of since Stalin's death, and apparently was removed like many of Stalin's victims without anything which could be called a trial.

In other respects also the present leaders can hardly claim that the past is all past. Mr. Khrushchev poured scorn on the accusation allegedly levelled by Stalin against Marshal Voroshilov, that he was a British agent, but this did not prevent the present leadership from levelling an equally improbable accusation against Beria, who was denounced at the time of his fall as having been a British agent and counter-revolutionary in the Caucasus in 1919-20.

The moral is that the present leaders—though lately they have made some reforms in the administration of justice—moved painfully slowly from the Stalinist system which they now denounce, and many more reforms have still to be made.

Daily Telegraph
June 11 1956

Questions Mr. Khrushchev Has Still to Answer

● Buried in the 25,000 word text of the original attack on Stalin by Mr. Khrushchev are many points the full significance of which will be clear only to close students of Soviet affairs.

DAVID FLOYD here analyses critical passages of the text and shows how many questions are left unanswered. The speech conceals as much as, or more than, it reveals.

THE version of Mr. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin just made available through the American State Department bears all the marks of authenticity. Even if the Russians eventually deny that it is a true report—as they may well do—it will be difficult to believe them.

Ever since the first deliberate "leaks" about the contents of the speech were made in Moscow last March there has been reason to believe that Mr. Khrushchev would not be displeased if the full speech became known in the West. It is not impossible that the leakage of the 25,000-word document was arranged by the Russians themselves. If not, it is one of the very rare occasions when their security system has failed.

Because the contents of the speech have been broken to the world gradually over a period of three months the impact of Mr. Khrushchev's revelations has been greatly softened. The impression has also been created that the speech was an honest confession of all the evils of the Soviet system. This is far from being so.

Supreme Scapegoat

IT is as careful a piece of pleading as any made by a Soviet leader. Its aim is to place all the responsibility for all the evils of Soviet Communism on one man. It is indeed a condemnation of Stalin. But it is equally an attempt to exonerate those who served Stalin most faithfully and to whitewash the system which he created.

It is true that it answers a good many questions about the Soviet system. But it leaves as many unanswered.

Mr. Khrushchev has, of course, made some welcome admissions about the nature of the Soviet system—the "great Socialist experiment." Here in two short extracts

from the speech is a description of that experiment in tyranny:

"He [Stalin] discarded the Leninist method of convincing and educating; he abandoned the method of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass repressions and terror. He acted on an increasingly larger scale and more stubbornly through the punitive organs, at the same time violating all existing norms of morality and of Soviet laws.

"Arbitrary behaviour by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of many thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and even desperation.

It is hard to believe that a system of repression on such a scale could be operated without the active assistance of many thousands and even tens of thousands of loyal Stalinists.

Could one man really impose his will in this way on nearly 200m. people? Even if we were to accept this, should we not at the same time have to condemn the system that left the way clear for him to do it?

"Guilty" By Torture

HOW false "confessions" were extracted from Stalin's enemies is a question that has intrigued observers for many years. Explanations have been sought in the nature of the Russian soul and in the use of secret drugs. It turns out to be much simpler:

"When Stalin said that one or another should be arrested it was necessary to accept on faith that he was an 'enemy of the people.' Meanwhile Beria's gang, which ran the organs of State security, outdid itself in proving the guilt of the arrested and the truth of materials which it falsified.

"And what proofs were offered? The confessions of the arrested, and the investigating judges accepted those 'confessions'.

"And how is it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he has not committed? Only in one way—because of the application of physical methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him to a state of unconsciousness, deprivation of his judgment, taking away his human dignity. In this manner were 'confessions' acquired."

This is most revealing, and disarming. But it would have been more reassuring if Mr. Khrushchev had told his listeners what there was to prevent such practices being resumed.

Where are the men now who specialised for so long in the business of extracting these "confessions"? Are they still in the police system or have they been removed? What guarantees are there in the Soviet system that another Stalin might not arise and use the same police system for the same purposes?

Stalin's Excuse

PERHAPS the most interesting document quoted by Mr. Khrushchev is a telegram he says Stalin sent out to all sections of the party and the secret police in January, 1939. It was a reply to party members who had been complaining of the methods used by the police:

"The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist party explains that the application of methods of physical pressure in N.K.V.D. practice was permissible from 1937 on.

"It is known that all bourgeois intelligence services use methods of physical influence against the representatives of the Socialist proletariat, and that they use them in their most scandalous forms. The question arises as to why the Socialist intelligence service should be more humanitarian against the mad agents of the bourgeoisie, against the deadly

enemies of the working class and of the kolkhoz workers.

"The Central Committee considers that physical pressure should still be used obligatorily, as an exception applicable to known and obstinate enemies of the people, as a method both justifiable and appropriate."

Mr. Khrushchev produced this document to show how Stalin sanctioned torture and oppression "in the name of the Central Committee." But it would seem that some-

thing more than Mr. Khrushchev's word is necessary to prove that the other members of the Central Committee had nothing at all to do with telegrams being sent out in their name.

Even if they did not know at the time of despatch, they must have known about it later, when the telegram was distributed throughout Russia. Did no member of the Committee protest?

A good deal of the Khrushchev speech is concerned with demolishing Stalin's reputation as a "military genius." In the interests of historical truth this is all to the good, though few Russians and fewer persons in the West were inclined to believe this particular myth. But there is a curious passage:

"It would be incorrect to forget that after the first severe disaster and defeats at the front Stalin thought that this was the end. In one of his speeches in those days he said: 'All that which Lenin created we have lost forever.'

"After this Stalin for a long time actually did not direct the military operations and ceased to do anything whatever. He returned to active leadership only when some members of the Political Bureau visited him and told him that it was necessary to take certain steps immediately to improve the situation at the front."

Tyrant Restored

HERE is a glimpse of what must be the most bizarre scene of the war. Stalin, a bestial tyrant, had imposed his will on the Soviet people, brought the country to the verge of economic disaster and by his treacherous dealings with Hitler exposed it to military defeat. He believes that everything has collapsed, abandons control of the State and the armed forces and "ceases to do anything whatever."

Stalin, in short, has thrown in the sponge. He is in the same state as Hitler found himself in 1945.

But, Mr. Khrushchev tells us, unlike Hitler, Stalin returned to active leadership—and at the urgent request of members of the Politbureau. Yet what better moment could there have been for breaking with Stalin and his ways? Why did they not seize it?

One conclusion seems clear. If the men around Stalin did not have the courage or determination in 1941 to remove him from power, it is unlikely that, as has been suggested in some quarters, they expedited his death in 1953. They were indeed the "scared men in the Kremlin."

Daily Telegraph
June 11 1956

STALIN REDWASHED

MR. KHRUSHCHEV's indictment of STALIN is a speech by a boss to bosses about the boss. It is not an address to a nation. In the gruesome and pitiful drama it unfolds the Russian people are the dumb chorus, gesticulating perhaps, but never speaking. The audience is one of Communist party leaders, alternately dazed and roused as the record of victims among high-ups — officials, party veterans, generals, police chiefs — is reeled off. What they hope to hear is never said: that the people, too, suffered terribly as they were driven into their collective farms and their new industrial towns. And not once do they hear it asked: if boss could be so unjust and cruel to boss, how much more merciless or arbitrary was boss to peasant and worker?

To this and other questions the answers have yet to come. They are missing even from the latest additions to the text that we publish this morning. Until they come, it should be understood that the evils of the Soviet system (for example, the man-made famine of the thirties) still await free and honest exposure by the heirs of the men responsible for them. What Mr. KHRUSHCHEV has done by heaping charge upon charge on STALIN's tomb is not to attack but indirectly and skilfully to defend the system of which he is chief administrator. These errors and crimes, he hints, were excrescences, deviations, personal distortions of the true Leninist way of life. Now that they have been sheared away, the system goes on. We and the Russian-in-the-street are expected meanwhile to believe that Soviet history for the past 20 years was dominated by a

madman and a mass murderer whom it was impossible to resist or remove. This cannot be more than half the truth, and it is therefore most important that Mr. KHRUSHCHEV's attempt to redwash his dead master and whitewash himself should be critically and expertly examined.

Daily Telegraph
Paris 12 1956

STALIN AS THE NEW SATAN

This second article on the text of Mr. Khrushchev's speech attacking Stalin deals with the suggestions that Stalin may have murdered Lenin, who deeply distrusted him, and Kirov, his closest rival.

By
DAVID FLOYD

WHEN Stalin's crimes are assessed by Mr. Khrushchev in terms of thousands of human lives it may seem irrelevant to worry about the deaths of two men that he may have caused. But they matter because they were major figures in Soviet history—Lenin and Kirov.

Mr. Khrushchev did not, as far as we know, go further than hinting at Stalin's responsibility for their deaths. But there is evidence to be considered from other sources.

At the beginning of his speech on the Stalin-cult, Mr. Khrushchev produced a number of documents bearing on Lenin's relations with Stalin in the last months of his life. None of these documents has been published before in Russia, and one of them, a letter from Lenin to Stalin, is now made public for the first time in the West. Here is the text:
To Comrade Stalin.
Copies for: Kamenev and Zinoviev.
Dear Comrade Stalin:

You permitted yourself a rude summons of my wife to the telephone and a rude reprimand of her. Despite the fact that she told you that she agreed to forget what was said, nevertheless Zinoviev and Kamenev heard about it from her. I have no intention to forget so easily that which is being done against me, and I need not stress here that I consider as directed against me that which is being done against my wife. I ask you, therefore, that you weigh carefully whether you are agreeable to retracting your words and apologising or whether you prefer the severance of relations between us.
Sincerely,

LENIN.

March 5, 1923.

The reading of this letter was said to have caused a commotion among the delegates. It is hardly

Mr. Khrushchev's hints on the deaths of Lenin and Kirov

surprising that the party officials present, taught since childhood to believe that Stalin was Lenin's closest collaborator in his lifetime and the faithful continuer of his work after he died, should have been shocked to learn Lenin's real opinion of Stalin.

Last Words

MORE important perhaps than Lenin's threat to "sever relations" is his reference to "that which is being done against me."

What was Stalin doing against Lenin? So grave a threat must have been provoked by something more than Stalin's rudeness to Lenin's wife Krupskaya, of which she had complained in another letter quoted by Mr. Khrushchev.

It is necessary to recall briefly the historical context of Lenin's note. Lenin had his first stroke in

May, 1922. When he recovered later that year he devoted much of his waning energy to exposing Stalin's policies and methods. In the middle of January, 1923, he recommended, as Mr. Khrushchev confirmed, Stalin's removal from the post of party General Secretary.

All this time Stalin was seeking access to Lenin and meeting Krupskaya's resistance. At the end of February he told Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, all Politburo members, that Lenin had asked him for poison.

On March 5 Stalin received the letter quoted above. These appear to have been the last words Lenin wrote.

Four days later Lenin suffered his most severe stroke, which paralysed his right side and deprived him of the power of speech. From that moment he played no further part in the affairs of the Soviet State, though it was not until January, 1924, that he died.

Trotsky's Version

DID Stalin, contrary to the decision of his colleagues in the Politburo, accede to Lenin's request for poison? Did Lenin make such a request, or was it an invention of Stalin's scheming mind? Did Stalin hasten Lenin's death in some other way?

Mr. Khrushchev did not answer these questions. Perhaps he does not know the truth.

Trotsky has put his own interpretation on Stalin's situation at that time:

"Either he could manage at once, this very day, to become the boss of the political machine and hence of the party and of the country, or he would be relegated to a third-rate role for the rest of his life. Stalin was after power, all of it, come what may. He already had a firm grip on it. His goal was near, but the danger emanating from Lenin was even nearer."

"Whether Stalin sent the poison to Lenin with the hint that the physicians had left no hope, or whether he resorted to more direct means I do not know. But I am firmly convinced that Stalin could not have waited passively when his fate hung by a thread and the decision depended on a small, very small motion of his hand."

From the moment Stalin received the letter Mr. Khrushchev has now published he knew that, in Trotsky's words, "Lenin's return to activity would mean the political death of the General Secretary. And conversely; only Lenin's death could clear the way for Stalin."

If Stalin did murder Lenin this would provide the clue to the whole of his 30 years' terror. First he would have to dispose of those who knew or suspected his guilty secret. Then he would have to get rid of all who supported Lenin's policies.

Whatever the prime cause, murder began murder until the dead were counted in millions. And the history of the Soviet régime, that Western sympathisers had called a "new civilisation," became the record of one man's brutal lust for power.

The affair of Kirov's death is less mysterious. That he was murdered on Dec. 1, 1934, is not in dispute. The only question is: Who was responsible?

As leader of the party organisation in Leningrad, Kirov had acquired an influence second only to Stalin's. The Stalinist explanation of his end is that he was murdered on the direct orders of Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev. Others have suggested that Stalin

himself arranged for the removal of the man who was becoming a threat to his power.

Mr. Khrushchev seems to share the latter view:

"It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances surrounding Kirov's murder hide many things which are inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful examination. There are reasons for the suspicion that the killer of Kirov, Nikolayev, was assisted by someone from among the people whose duty it was to protect the person of Kirov.

"A month and a half before the killing Nikolayev was arrested on the grounds of suspicious behaviour, but he was released and not even searched. It is an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the Chekist assigned to protect Kirov was being brought for an interrogation on Dec. 2, 1934, he was killed in a car 'accident' in which no other occupants of the car were harmed.

"After the murder of Kirov, top functionaries of the Leningrad M.K.V.D. were given very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can assume that they were shot in order to cover the traces of the organisers of Kirov's killing."

Mr. Khrushchev did not name the organisers. But his finger was pointing fairly clearly at Stalin.

Hatred the Key

WHY should he go to such lengths not only to demolish Stalin's political reputation but to heap contempt on his person, to transform idolatry into hatred? Why charge him, even if indirectly, with the murder of men established in the popular mind as the best-loved leaders of the Soviet State?

Hatred is indeed the keynote of the whole of Mr. Khrushchev's speech. Perhaps he thought that since Stalin could not be obliterated and was no longer to be the Soviet god he must be made the Russian Satan. Perhaps, too, the hatred which informs every phrase reflects the new leader's dismay at the problems he has inherited.

Let no one suppose, then, that this tirade against Stalin is in any sense a condemnation of the régime which he established and which his heirs are there to defend. For nowhere did Mr. Khrushchev say that a system which permitted a ruthless leader to rise to supreme power by murder, torture and repression is a bad system.

How far is the present "collective" prepared and able to go along the road to real freedom for the Soviet peoples? That is the acid test, the supreme question that Mr. Khrushchev has yet to answer.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY

Thursday, June 3, 1956

THE HYDRA-MENT OF STALIN

By a Student of Soviet Affairs

THE text of the now famous Khrushchev speech denouncing Stalin and much—but not all—of what he had stood for has now been released by the United States State Department. It was obtained through unofficial channels, apparently from one of the staff of the Communist Section. The State Department does not vouch for the accuracy of the text, but presumably it would not have released it had it not been reasonably certain of it.

Of the many versions of the speech, or parts of it, which have become available since the Moscow party congress, this is the most reliable one and will take its place in political literature as a document of historic importance. It marks the end of one era and the beginning of another to a far greater extent than did the death of Stalin. If it is still not clear from it what this new era would signify, this is because Khrushchev himself probably had little idea of the consequences of his speech.

No doubt the Communist party leader intended it as a call to the party and to the nation, to work with and to help the new leadership. The loss seemed to be that, since he was now frankly denouncing the horrors of the Stalin regime, his listeners and those to whom the speech has been circulated—and they include much of the adult population of Russia—could assume that the new leadership would not perpetrate similar crimes against the people.

But whether or not he expected the question "What were you doing when Stalin was committing those crimes?" this has repeatedly been asked in Russia, not just by the delegates to the party congress but also, according to recent travellers from Moscow, by many

rank-and-file party members and by the people at large. Indeed, since the speech was made, there has been to be some "tempting" of it because it did not redound to the credit of the Soviet leadership. That the Russian leader that Stalin left the country in a state of "preparation" for war was later withdrawn by "Khrushchev Zvezda," the Soviet paper, which insisted that the Central Committee—which included the present leadership—knew all about the coming war and had made the necessary preparations for it.

The text of the speech, however, makes it clear that the preparations were far from complete, and that there were not even enough rifles to go round at the beginning of the war. There is a striking passage in the speech where Stalin is said to have given up all hope after the first defeats, and to have removed himself from active leadership. But apparently because he was the only man who knew enough about the country's position to lead the struggle, the Politburo members begged him to resume command.

Later, after the war, he was said to have threatened these same Politburo members—such as Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and Molotov—with liquidation. Khrushchev makes it clear that had Stalin not died when he did, these Soviet leaders would have shared the fate of many others who perished in the thirties.

The publication of the speech has some relevance to Marshal Tito's present visit to Russia. Although Khrushchev admitted that Stalin's charges against Tito were false, he added that this did not mean "that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have shortcomings." It was something like this, though in veiled language, that was said publicly by Molotov last year, presumably on the basis of Khrushchev's speech, and was angrily repudiated by the Yugoslavs. Now the author of the remark is shown to be Khrushchev, who is receiving Tito in Moscow.

THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY

Thursday, June 7, 1956

THE NEW MEN

WHEN Marshal Tito heard on his arrival in Moscow that Mr Molotov had resigned from the Foreign Ministry he must have felt even more than usual like an elder statesman among the active leaders of international communism. The Marshal may also have wondered whether the timing of Mr Molotov's removal was not meant to propitiate him, since Mr Molotov shared with Stalin the responsibility for the breach with Yugoslavia. Apart from that there is nothing very startling about the change. The new men have been taking over the leadership of the Soviet Union for some years. Mr Molotov's age—he is sixty-six and in those sixty-six years has been through a great deal—makes his retirement natural enough. As a Deputy Prime Minister he will be the only important leader besides Marshal Voroshilov who can look back on an important share in politics before the Revolution. Mr Molotov is a survivor in another sense. He does not seem to have had an easy time adapting himself to the temper of the new "collective leadership." After years of faithful service as Stalin's executant he is not cut out for a smiling, flexible diplomacy. Times have moved fast. Of the three leaders who spoke at Stalin's funeral—Beria, Molotov,

Malenkov—one is dead, one is in semi-retirement, and one is playing an inconspicuous though no doubt important part in the "collective leadership." Mr Shepilov, the new Foreign Minister, is one of the new men who have risen notably since Stalin's death. He is fifty—and it is nearly forty years since the Revolution. He has spent most of his working life as an official of a well-established party and governing body. How will the "collective leadership" develop, staffed as it is and will be with men like him? Precedents are no guide. (Who remembers the names of the French Directory? Or Cambacérès and Lebrun, who shared a collective leadership of a kind with Napoleon when he was First Consul?) It will be worth watching how the new men now shape the Government which once shaped their own lives.

The text of Mr Khrushchev's famous speech to the Soviet party congress, now released in Washington, dots the "i"s in Stalin's iniquity. It does not differ in essentials from what had already leaked out. The text is not put forward as authentic beyond doubt. This need not matter much: Mr Khrushchev will no doubt publish his speech for the benefit of historians when he feels it safe to do so. The Washington text confirms what was

known about Stalin's ill-treatment of the Army, his mistakes during the war, and his blunder over Yugoslavia, though the details are more lurid than we had heard. "I will shake my little finger and there will be no more Tito" is, if correctly reported, a good quotation for the history books. Other new details in the present text are that Stalin might have done away with Mr Molotov and Mr Mikoyan if he had lived and that in the purges of the thirties the secret police used "barbaric tortures" to secure false confessions. This also fits in with what was known. But although Mr Khrushchev, it seems, made free with Lenin's unfavourable remarks about Stalin in his testament, he did not call in question Stalin's achievement in the twenties and early thirties. What the new text does is to show Stalin in his last years as no less mad than Caligula or Nero, a deified ruler ridden with persecution mania. Even so some questions are still unanswered. The "doctors' plot," though it had the mark of madness upon it, testified to a struggle for power in Stalin's last days that must have involved other people besides Stalin and Beria. Historians might still ask Mr Khrushchev for more light. He himself, after all, was more than a mere onlooker.

THE OBSERVER, SUNDAY, JUNE 10, 1956

Khrushchev Exposure of Stalin in Full

By EDWARD CRANKSHAW

THE Khrushchev indictment of Stalin, delivered in secret session to the Communist Party Congress last February, proves to be even more radical, comprehensive, and bitter than the first incomplete reports suggested, sensational as these were.

Soviet history from 1934, the year of the murder of Kirov, to 1953, the year of Stalin's death, has been turned completely upside down. The Khrushchev version (given fully below) corresponds with astonishing exactitude in detail and in general trend with the past findings of Stalin's foreign critics, for so long denounced by Moscow, and by Communist parties everywhere, as malicious slanders.

The worst constructions placed on many of Stalin's actions are now officially confirmed. Ordzhonikidze, Stalin's fellow-Georgian, the friend of his youth, and master of the Caucasus, was driven to suicide by Stalin. The suspicious circumstances surrounding the murder of Kirov, the highly popular chief of the Leningrad Bolsheviks and at one time regarded as Stalin's natural successor, are emphasised, and although Khrushchev does not accuse Stalin directly of the crime he hints very strongly that he had a hand in it.

It was Kirov's death that touched off the great purges of the thirties, in which the Communist Party and the officers corps were decimated. And although the worst excesses of these purges are attributed to Yezhov, the degenerate Chief of Secret Police, Khrushchev explicitly underlines the fact that Yezhov was acting under Stalin's orders.

He quotes, moreover, from an order signed by Stalin himself commanding the use of torture to extract confessions from those accused of being "enemies of the people"; and he revealed that already by February of this year, after the examination of thousands of individual cases, 7,679 individuals had been rehabilitated, "many posthumously," after the charges against them had been proved groundless.

There is nothing mystical about Khrushchev's "darkness at noon": the confessions were extracted by torture. The chief victims of the purges, the "Trotskyites, Zinovievites and Bukharinites" have not been rehabilitated. Khrushchev explicitly condemns their deviations. But, at the same time, he expresses the view that there was no need to shoot them.

Khrushchev joined the Politburo in 1939, and in these last years he personally was involved. It is impossible not to wonder how deeply, as he pours out charges helter-skelter in tones even more scathing and bitter: Stalin's military crassness; Stalin building himself up into a quasi-deity (the films and the books about him "make us sick"); Stalin riding roughshod over the Politburo and breaking it up as an effective force; Stalin shooting out of hand five of his most gifted younger supporters in the Leningrad Affair (including Voznesensky, the brilliant Chairman of the State Planning Commission, who simply vanished in 1949).

Stalin, too, conniving at the machinations of "traitor" Beria; his disgraceful treatment of Marshal Zhukov; his mass deportation of the whole peoples from the Caucasus and the Black Sea ("the Ukrainians escaped this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to deport them"); then the final terror and the fabrication of the Doctors' Plot.

The tirade reaches its climax with the revelation that Stalin was planning "the annihilation" of the old Politburo members: Voroshilov, now President of the U.S.S.R., was already under suspicion of being an English agent; Andreyev had been dismissed and relegated to limbo; "baseless charges" had been brought against Mikoyan and Molotov. "It is not excluded that had Stalin remained at the helm for another few months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would probably not have delivered any speeches at this Congress."

It is clear that for these, and no doubt for Khrushchev himself, Stalin's death was most convenient.

THE ECONOMIST, JUNE 9, 1956

Stalin's Epitaph

THE text of Mr Khrushchev's attack on Stalin has finally found its way into the western press. Delivered at a secret session of the Soviet party congress towards the close of February, it leaked and created an immediate stir in the Soviet Union. Versions were later circulated to communist parties in eastern Europe and elsewhere, to explain the anti-Stalinist campaign and to ensure if possible that the drive for collective leadership should be extended outside the Soviet Union itself. By now several texts have reached western governments, and the State Department has decided to release a version, not guaranteeing its authenticity but stressing the reliability of the source. The text rings true, makes fascinating reading, and calls for comment at length. A few things, however, can be said at once.

In the first place, there is a striking contrast between Khrushchev in the open and Khrushchev behind closed doors. A few days previously he had been cautious in his condemnation of Stalin. At the secret session he delivered a violent indictment. In his first speech he still referred to oppositionists as "enemies of the people"; in the second he described the very application of such terms to deviationists as Stalin's diabolical invention. There must have been many awkward questions from the floor, probably precipitated by the more outspoken Mikoyan, to spur a guarded Khrushchev to such passionate fury. And what has been said to the privileged few has not yet been openly broadcast to the Soviet people. Secondly, in a most un-Marxist fashion all the blame is put on Stalin alone and not on the system. This seems a curious cult of the individual in reverse, with Stalin appearing as a *diabolus ex machina* and developing his worst feature at a specific time, somewhere in the late 'thirties. Finally, there are still several Stalinist distortions and instances of deliberate confusion in the speech (e.g., the assertion that Trotskyites were opposed to industrialisation). The shooting of more "Beria men," Bagirov and his associates in the Caucasus, has also provided a fresh reminder that the methods of Stalin have not wholly been embalmed with their author. But the questions and the pressures which caused Khrushchev to change so much in so few days are still at work, forcing the Soviet rulers to bury more and more bits and pieces of Stalinism.

WEST GERMANY

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 June, excerpt:

The picture, which the dispassionate reader gets from this version of the report, which doubtlessly is still very toned-down, is ghastly. We see that Trotsky did not lie when he spoke of Lenin's derogatory opinion of Stalin, of the so-called "Testament," and of the conflict between Stalin and Lenin's widow, Mrs. Krupskaya. We see that the Western world's impression of the USSR corresponded to the facts. From the mouth of a man who must know the exact facts, those persons who, during the dictator's lifetime, simply refused to believe what they heard about Moscow, now are learning the bloody truth. In fact, of the victims, Khrushchev named only the prominent members of the party hierarchy, a relatively small group from which the misery of the mass of nameless victims can be inferred. Among the hair-raising mass deportations, the report makes no mention of the fate of the half-million Volga Germans who were chased out of their homeland, the Volga German Republic, at the end of 1941; the unhappy Crimean Tatars; and the hundred thousand Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians who still are forced settlers in Siberia. It only gives passing mention of what the German prisoners of war and the deported persons suffered in the USSR, including tens of thousands of completely innocent persons who were abandoned to the same despotic justice. In addition to all the horrible facts which Khrushchev enumerated, can one forget how much of the injustice which Stalin created still continues? And can one see any readiness on Khrushchev's part to make up for past events?

SWITZERLAND

Neue Zuercher Zeitung (noon edition), 5 June 1956

The publication of the text of Khrushchev's speech at the Moscow Party Congress is treated here as a great and almost sensational event, and it is obviously hoped that difficulties will thereby be created for the Soviets in the countries of Eastern Europe and perhaps even in the USSR. It is also hoped here that the publication will have a sobering effect upon those circles in the countries of the Western alliance which, according to the opinion here, have been all too ready to move from the blackness of Stalin to the white purity of Khrushchev. According to opinion here, the world public had only learned of Khrushchev's accusations against Stalin in a general and considerably toned-down way. The Russians have tried to dispense their de-Stalinization policy to the masses in small, mild doses and thus keep the expected political and psychological disturbances to a minimum. Now, however, the American government has come into possession of this document and is obviously endeavoring to pass on the detailed contents to those, whose personal life is most affected by it, namely the citizens of the Eastern European countries.

In their commentaries, American officials especially emphasize that the text not only shows the unprincipled brutality of Stalin, but also the immanent brutality of the Communist system. These crimes against humanity of which Khrushchev speaks did happen, and therefore there is not the slightest guarantee that, if it is in the interests of the Kremlin, they will not happen again soon under the new regime. It is also especially emphasized that Khrushchev's indignation was directed only at crimes which Stalin perpetrated against Russian party comrades, not against the outrages of which the victims were non-Communists. Khrushchev's attempt to create an alibi and to free himself and his present colleagues of all complicity in Stalin's crimes is considered here, on the basis of his speech, to have failed completely.

There are no reliable indications here yet as to why this time was chosen for the publication of this document. Some diplomatic observers believe it was an attempt to make Soviet negotiations with Tito more difficult; however, the

fact that Yugoslavia was rather better informed about the Khrushchev's speech than the Western governments contradicts this interpretation. Before they themselves got possession of the text, experts here considered an article, which appeared in the Yugoslav party organ Borba three months ago, as the most complete presentation of the event. Therefore the most plausible explanation for the timing of the declaration is that the State Department apparently did just obtain the text a few days ago and that its publication was decided upon because it was believed that the fragmentary reports, which were more and more frequently appearing in the world press, were playing into the hands of the Russians, whereas publication of the speech in all its unvarnished detail must be very embarrassing for the Kremlin. The State Department's introduction states that the document came from a "confidential source." As reported, it is an edited and toned-down, but fairly complete version of the speech as it was given by the Kremlin to the party functionaries in the Satellite countries.

SWEDEN

Svenska Dagbladet, 6 June, excerpt:

But whether Stalin's propitious demise was the work of lucky chance, or whether chance was helped along by willing human hands, it is obvious that it carried with it an immense relief for his closest colleagues. One would like to believe that the same relief will be granted the Soviet People, the satellites, and the whole world. There are signs apparent which indicate that this may be the case. The cult of the personality has been abolished, most drastically, through the unmasking of Stalin. Work camps are being abolished, it is said; trial methods being made more humane, and the central bureaucracy being weakened. The size of the armed forces is being reduced, and friendship offensives are going forward in all parts of the world.

All of this sounds so good that the conclusion presents itself: Too good to be true. One cannot help remembering that the men who now proclaim their abhorrence of the dead tyrant and his policies were his willing tools in the execution of these policies. And, above all, one cannot free oneself of the thought that these policies were results not only of Stalin's character, but, probably as much or more, of the system of which he was the incarnation.

This system, the system of the totalitarian state, sooner or later leads to the despotism of terror. And it is not against the system the new Soviet leaders have turned, but against the fact that it was used in the wrong way, and, above all, against the wrong persons. There is therefore every reason to remember that as long as the totalitarian system is maintained and not replaced with a free government by the people, no guarantee exists against the return of the rule of "the crooked little finger" [referring to Stalin's statement that he could destroy Tito by crooking his little finger].

Dagens Nyheter, 7 June, excerpt:

Stalin's partner in crime was Beria. But it would be swallowing a new myth to accept Khrushchev's assertions concerning Beria's crimes. Khrushchev's speech is an extraordinarily important document which will furnish historians

much new material, but the intention [of Khrushchev's speech] was to crush the Stalin myth and to establish the legitimacy of the present rulers--not to tell the truth about the Soviet Union, except where the truth happened to coincide with the interests of the rulers.

Khrushchev has attempted to explain why he and his fellows could not revolt against Stalin. Why they groveled in the dust, why they extolled one another in praising a purpose which could not have been more base, he leaves unexplained. The answer is that they were sufficiently depraved, sufficiently conscienceless to stifle all misgivings, and that they quite simply had no scruples at all. Stalin has been pilloried--but not he alone.

NORWAY

Aftenposten, 6 June.

The publication of Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech confirms Washington in its belief that the policies of the new Soviet rulers carry with them no conscious change in the nature of Communism. In Khrushchev's speech the insane dictator is condemned for misuse of power, but the terror weapon as such is not condemned. On the contrary, "extraordinary methods" are recommended where necessary against "enemies of the revolution and the working class." It can and must be used where the "exploiting classes" are still in existence and resist the revolution.

The banning of the cult of Stalin and the drastic revelations of Khrushchev's speech are seen as means of strengthening the positions of, and justifying, the present rulers, despite the fact that they were Stalin's accomplices. They disclaim responsibility for 20 years of mass terror. They blame Stalin for the murder of Kirov in 1934, which was the pretext for the great purge in the Party. They accuse him of planning the annihilation of all of the old Bolsheviks in the Politburo--from Ordzhonikidze in 1937 to Molotov in 1953--in order to surround himself with subversive Communists of the younger generation.

Their the present rulers' argument is that such a ruthlessness, which has cost thousands of people their lives, is unnecessary at a time so long after the victory of Communism in a country. But they maintain that "ruthless and uncompromising" severity is necessary in places where Communism is not yet in power. They do not remove one iota from the revolutionary theory of Communism.

The American Communist newspaper the Daily Worker today published a 4,000 word excerpt of Khrushchev's speech. The New York Times printed the whole speech, as published yesterday by the US Government, supplemented by a biographic index. In an editorial this newspaper writes: "This speech must necessarily stand as one of the dramatic documents in the world. It is a description of a hell on earth in a country which millions of naive people once thought was on the way to becoming Heaven." The newspaper is of the opinion that the text of the speech is the version which the Moscow

government sent to Marshal Tito in the middle of March. The Western Powers have had it in their possession since the middle of May. The opinion is held that even this version is not the complete text of the speech of 24-25 February. A section was deleted, which Moscow did not consider healthful reading for foreign Communists.

Washington's attention is drawn to the fact that criticism of Stalin's foreign policy--except as it concerned his relations with Tito--was limited to a single sentence, which deplored that Stalin's policies endangered the Soviet Union's peaceful relations with other countries. It is supposed that a more detailed criticism was either censored away or reserved for another attack on Stalin. It is considered possible that the Soviet government will at a later date dramatically reveal the background of the Korean War and other Communist aggressive actions during the time of Stalin.

Oslo Labor Party Arbeiderbladet, 8 June

The almost complete text of Khrushchev's speech at the Party Congress gives an even darker and more frightening picture than that furnished by the first short excerpts published. Under Stalin, the most prominent people of the Party lived in constant fear of their lives, and the passionate hatred discernible in Khrushchev's words was certainly genuine enough. But if we read the speech carefully, without letting ourselves be numbed by the sensational revelations or the violent words, we must once more ask how all this could happen. Khrushchev has no other explanation than the evil character of Stalin. The baseness and ruthlessness which were always characteristic of him finally took the upper hand. This, therefore, was the reason why things went wrong.

Here Khrushchev is in reality creating a new Stalin legend by turning the old legend inside out. Where Stalin formerly got credit for everything that was good, he alone must now carry the guilt for everything that is evil. The god of the old faith becomes the devil of the new. Such things have happened before in the history of religion.

Isaac Deutscher, the Stalin biographer, said in an interview with Arbeiderbladet that the Soviet leaders would perhaps go too far in blackening Stalin--because they and the

Party must cleanse themselves of the responsibility. We do not believe that Khrushchev blackened Stalin beyond the truth, and far be it from us to defend Stalin. But is apparent from Khrushchev's speech that he sought to heap responsibility for everything upon Stalin--and upon Stalin's chiefs of police--in order to relieve all others of guilt.

But people do not easily forget that the present Soviet leaders are just the men who followed Stalin through thick and thin. They survived the purges of the 1930s because they themselves were the toughest. At the time when Party secretaries and ministers by the score disappeared, Malenkov was the head of the personnel section of the Party. Khrushchev became Party secretary in the Ukraine when the whole old leadership was liquidated. And it was Khrushchev's trusted chief of police Serov who carried out the inhuman deportation of hundreds of thousands of persons from the Baltic states in 1940.

After the death of Beria, said Khrushchev, the Soviet leaders went through the police files and found proof that innocent people had been condemned and that their confessions were false. But no one can make us believe that they did not know this before.

Many people will ask: Can Khrushchev and his colleagues be sincere? Is this not just a convenient tactic to gain the trust of both foreign countries and the home population?

We believe they are sincere enough. Through many years before the death of Stalin they must have felt themselves standing upon the brink of that abyss into which so many had been hurled. And Stalin finally turned upon his oldest and closest collaborators, we are now told--upon such men as Vorozhilov, Molotov, and Mikoyan.

The new leaders are men who have just awakened from a nightmare--and it is not likely that they wish to go through the same thing once more.

This wish lies behind many of the reforms now being carried out in the Soviet Union. But Khrushchev contents himself with disavowing Stalin's personal dictatorship, the forms it took, and the terror which struck at good Communists

and innocent persons. He upholds the doctrine of Party dictatorship and the right to use terror against those who resist.

All historical experience shows that any dictatorship easily develops into a personal dictatorship, and that it is most likely that he who is the strongest, the toughest, and the most ruthless grasps the reins. He who assists in the building up of a dictatorship and in using terror against those who think differently is in deadly danger of being hurled into and maimed by the machine he serves.

For Khrushchev and his fellows, this bitter lesson ought to be written in fire on the walls of the Kremlin. And for the adherents of dictatorship here at home also.

FRANCE

Press Review, 20 June, excerpts:

Le Populaire denounces the hypocrisy of the Communist leaders who have been forced to tell the truth only as a result of the pressure of the militant rank-and-file of their party. Yet our surprise is justified when we hear the executive of the French Communist party regretting the conditions in which the disclosure of the Khrushchev report was made.

It is sheer mockery to say that the French Communists were unacquainted with the facts contained in Khrushchev's report. The French party representatives at the 20th Congress knew it, but they meant to remain silent as long as possible about the truths confessed by the Russian leaders, for these were in flagrant contradiction to what has always been asserted to the French workers.

Les Echos suggests that all this may well be merely a stage setting arranged by the Soviet leaders themselves. All this seeming malaise about the presumed de-Stalinization may well be merely a smokescreen to conceal the mounting of the new red dispositions--the creation of so-called national Communist parties free of the oath of allegiance to Moscow. Rid of the bogey of repressions, Communism could thus, in its leaders' opinion, find it easier to ally itself with the national socialist parties, prepare (the path) to popular fronts, and reintegrate the reins of power.

Liberation seems to justify this theory. The paper says: we of the left, who have but two goals--the union of the left and peace, without which there can be no social progress--cannot but welcome what is happening. Will unity not be facilitated by the elimination of the points of discord between the parties of the left? Will not peace gain from the consolidation of the detente?

Franc-Tireur says that according to Khrushchev, Stalin appears as a monster who caused tortures, murder, and deportation, like a Caligula or a Nero. The French Communist party can no longer act as though it were deaf. It would seem

natural that its leaders, its pontiffs, its thinkers, and its bards should forever be disqualified. It would seem reasonable, in the very interests of a party of the working class that follows them, that they should surrender the leadership. But the dialectics of the big lie have inexhaustible resources.

ITALY

La Giustizia, 7/8 June

The publication of the report delivered by Nikita Khrushchev to the delegates at the 20th Congress of the CPSU has not added very much to what we already knew about this report, but it has served to give a precise tone of officiality to the crimes and errors imputed to Stalin by the present Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party.

This officiality is confirmed by the fact that it has been 3 days since the US State Department released the full text of Khrushchev's speech and there has been no denial from Moscow.

We can clearly deduce from this that the men of the Kremlin have no reason to take exception to the version released by the US Government, and that there is a strong probability that the report came into American hands with Soviet consent.

The reading of the full text of Khrushchev's summing-up leads us to consider the document as one of the most tragic and dramatic accusations of all times, comparable, in substance, to the volumes of charges against the Nazi criminals deposited in the secret files of the Allies after the Nurnberg trial. The errors and crimes of Stalin have affected and still affect not only the people of the USSR and the other nations under Soviet control but also all mankind. Every nation for many years has been threatened by the ascendancy of Communism and the consequent application of Stalinist methodology. Here is the reason that the posthumous trial of Stalin cannot be considered a purely internal matter of the USSR.

Stalinism is a frightful experience felt by the world in the same way as Hitlerism. However, at Nurnberg, Nazism and not Hitler was on trial. Today, Khrushchev's report, whether we like it or not, is clearly a summing-up of the case against Communist method and ideology.

Soviet Communism is actually on trial. Stalin was responsible for the massacres, deportations, the butcherings, etc. But the criminal madness of the Georgian dictator would

not have found a way to express itself if the Communist method and the Soviet constitution were not such as to allow the despot to centralize the power in his own hands.

A New York newspaper has written, "Communist ideology and Soviet fanaticism are on trial, not Stalin and the Stalinist group. The thought that a better world can be created by following a road strewn with corpses is the starting point of Stalinism."

We wrote this at the time when the Georgian dictator was being desanctified but it is worth repeating if, indeed, Khrushchev's report can be considered by the Communists as only a revisionist document. To us it means something quite different. Yesterday, the New York Herald Tribune published an editorial stating "Only one conclusion can be drawn from all the breast-beating by Khrushchev: the system of repression has produced Stalin and it will produce others like him in the same way."

Here is the point of the question: the Iron Curtain has been raised by Khrushchev and by the men of the "new course." What we have perceived has not surprised us, because no man who is free and who loves liberty can be surprised by the infamies perpetrated by a dictator, but it has terrified us just the same.

If, tomorrow, the curtain should fall again (surely crushing under its weight the protagonists of the "new course") we would not be surprised. So long as the constitution of the USSR remains unchanged and power can be centralized in the hands of one man or of a limited group, a "relapse" of the USSR into Stalinism cannot be excluded.

This peril does not concern only the Russian people but also the entire thinking world.

Il Popolo, 6 June

Khrushchev's report against Stalin, given during the last Communist congress in Moscow and published yesterday by the Department of State, is a document without precedents on the decades of Soviet terror. The ample indiscretions which leaked out previously in connection with Khrushchev's speech fell short of the truth; the text published in Washington goes

further in harshness and minuteness. It is a quarter of a century of Soviet life which is crumbling, while the heirs and former collaborators of the defunct dictator are striving, after causing this earthquake themselves, not only to save themselves from it somehow, but actually to derive a psychological advantage from it.

The Department of State has not guaranteed the authenticity of the document; it could have done this only if the document had reached Washington directly and officially from the Moscow rulers. But the confidential sources from which the text has come (from Poland, apparently) and the obvious precautions which the US government must have taken before authorizing its publication are such as to eliminate any doubt concerning the consistency of the publication.

Furthermore, we are certainly not astonished by Khrushchev's revelations; in fact, we can say that for very many persons the term "Revelations," in connection with the report sounds completely arbitrary. It is not a question of anything new but of confirmation of the atrocities, oppression, and despotism which we already knew well: the only new aspect which Khrushchev and company are now trying to present to us is, if anything, their "innocence," their nonparticipation in so many crimes. The present prophets of anti-Stalinism are attempting to make us forget all the years during which the dictator, in his every action, found support in their indispensable collaboration and complicity; and in this desperate attempt they can do no better than to recall the perpetual terror by which they were affected. Stalin was a wild beast; his immediate subordinates were rabbits: this is the irresistible image which a reading of the report brings to mind. But it is not enough to proclaim one's own fear to escape from so many bloody responsibilities.

In any case, thus far we are only repeating old things. The most significant aspect which we can now see in Khrushchev's report--which the previous resumes did not enable us to pinpoint as yet--is another one: the secretary of the CPSU has execrating words for the massacres of "innocent and honest Communists" ordered by Stalin; but has not devoted one single word to the millions of other persons exterminated under the dictatorship. On the contrary, Khrushchev has substantially approved these greater massacres when he cited as an example to be followed the "revolutionary violence" advocated by Lenin, i.e., the elimination of the "exploiting classes" (specifically, all the anti-Communists, the democrats above all). All the middle-class people, peasants, Catholics, and clergymen assassinated during the Bolshevik regime do not find in Khrushchev's charges one single word of repentance or recrimination.

This, in our opinion, is today the most important aspect of the document published in Washington. We already knew everything about the old Communism; and while an attempt is now being made to smuggle in a Soviet "new course," perhaps less bestial but certainly more insidious than the old one, we must reflect especially upon that which Khrushchev has "not" said. The fate of possible opponents, freedom of democratic discussion, a guarantee that there will not be a repetition not only of Stalin's methods but also of Lenin's: the secretary of the CPSU did not express himself on this, nor could he do so. The Communists who had been knifed in the back received their funeral oration at the 20th Congress; the millions of anti-Communists assassinated with equal ferocity, on the other hand, have remained in their common graves without a flower or a tear.

AUSTRIA

Die Presse, 9 June

The text of the speech which Khrushchev gave on 24 February to the 20th CPSU Congress and which was recently made public by the US State Department should give rise to some food for thought. The published portion of the text contains 25,000 words and was made available to the foreign Communist parties by the Kremlin. Considerable portions of the speech, however, are still reportedly missing.

But the part which is already available gives the free world an alarming insight into the brutal reality of the Soviet system. Alarming not so much because of Stalin's crimes, which Khrushchev reported to his surprised audience with moralistic remarks but which destroyed no illusions in the Western world about the characteristics and moral qualities of the Red dictator, but alarming because of the deep cynicism with which the present leading actors of the Kremlin are attempting to push off all the innumerable murders, mistakes, and crimes of the Communist government in the USSR on the dead Stalin whom they all served, perhaps not honorably and loyally, but cringingly and obviously to their own benefit, for a generation. Instead they are trying to portray themselves as humanists, world reformers, and disciples of the alone-sanctifying Lenin. Khrushchev's speech and all the vindicating propaganda which has been sent out for the past few months is designed to prove that Communism and the Soviet system are correct and spotless, only Stalin was a murderer and -- what is especially being criticized now -- a dilettante who became insane.

In order not to be taken in by this huge bluff of the sly Khrushchev, the free world would do well to remember certain facts: that Stalin's mastery was neither a coincidence nor a deplorable misunderstanding, but the logical result of the development of an evil system; a system which, from the first, offers no way of preventing the absolute abuse of absolute power. The present leaders of the USSR have not yet shown one single bit of proof that together with the damning of Stalin they intend to liquidate the system which produced Stalin. On the contrary, the Kremlin continues to exercise absolute power in the Soviet empire. Everything has remained the same, with the single exception that the one-man dictatorship over the

party and state has grown into a collective of three, six, or eight persons. Moreover, only those crimes of the Stalinist period which could endanger either the personal existence of the Communist leadership clique itself or the foundations of its power seem particularly to excite Khrushchev and his collective-leadership team. The fact that 98 of the 139 members of the Politburo were liquidated by Stalin almost moved Khrushchev to tears. The execution of thousands of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest on the other hand, or even the conscious starving of millions of Russian peasants seems to have had his complete approval, since he does not even mention them.

Khrushchev indubitably gave future biographers of Stalin valuable material on his life, deeds, and crimes. In addition, ~~he revealed some alarming aspects of life from the dark back~~ ground of the Soviet empire. However, he can in no way credit himself with making the Soviet sociably acceptable outside its realm of power. Because, even if Khrushchev, Bulganin, or Mikoyan are now playing first fiddle instead of Stalin, the USSR has remained an absolute dictatorship, from which the elements human dignity, namely freedom and the right of the individual, remain banished.

Greece

Athens, I Kathimerini, 6 June

According to the text of the historic speech of Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress of Russia, "if Stalin had not died, he would have purged Molotov and Mikoyan." This sentence, according to the opinion of American specialists in Soviet affairs, reveals that Stalin did not die a natural death but was executed. This is very possible. However, it is not of great significance whether Stalin died a natural or violent death. What is significant is his post-mortem "execution" by those same people who worshipped him when he was alive as "the sun of the universe" and who sang his blood-painted fame to seventh heaven. Because, as has been repeatedly said -- and it must be repeated in every instance -- the "execution" of the moral and political idol of Stalin testified to something deeper than the overthrow of the "principles" and methods of his own period. It constitutes a proof of the lies on which the present generation of the Soviet leadership -- the so-called collective leadership -- has grown and still lives.

Denmark

Social-Demokraten, 7 June

The text of Khrushchev's speech to the 20th Party Congress, published by the American government confirms and deepens the shocking picture which the excerpts of the speech already published had drawn of Stalin as a power mad, bloodthirsty, and finally insane criminal who held absolute power over the millions of people of the Soviet Union.

Some questions arise anew: Why did not Khrushchev himself publish the speech since the intention was to destroy the Stalin myth? Why have the contents of the speech leaked out gradually, and been neither confirmed nor denied? Did the Soviet leaders hesitate to administer the shock to the people which the full truth would produce? And another question: Why did the circle of leaders which felt their lives threatened make no resistance? The lives of Molotov and Mikoyan were certainly saved by the truly monumental piece of luck that fate -- as Khrushchev said -- "let Stalin die on 5 March 1953".

Recently Khrushchev answered this question before the Danish Folketing members when he said that it would have been legally possible to replace Stalin, but impossible as a practical measure. Why impossible? Part of the explanation lies, of course, in the position of immense power Stalin had prepared for himself, and the paralyzing fear which surrounded him -- but the real explanation is to be found in the system. It was the system which -- although originally "collectively led" -- gave Stalin the possibility of building up an authority which required blind subjection. It was the system which gave into his hands all the sources of power of the police state, and thus all the possibilities for sating his lust for power and his thirst for blood.

However the joint responsibility [for Stalin's crimes] is evaluated, which falls to Stalin's collaborators, it is clear that the main indictment strikes at the Soviet system. The Stalin revelations furnish a shocking picture of the nature of this system -- of the appalling possibilities inherent in a police state where only one party is tolerated, where there is no freedom of speech, and where the press is a regimented monopoly.

Social-Demokraten, 8 June

In a flowery article concerning the new Stalin revelations, Land og Folk wrote yesterday that developments in the Soviet Union mean that "the stupid and unrestrained smear campaign against the Soviet Union which for years has been comme il faut is untenable and untrue."

The "smear campaign" that the Communist paper dares speak about has, of course, primarily been directed against the shocking misdeeds of Stalin perpetrated under a system, the most obvious elements of which were these: A despotism, under which a tyrant who gradually became insane made himself the undisputed master of the millions of people of the Soviet Union. A justice and police apparatus which arbitrarily murdered thousands of innocent people who were tortured into giving false confessions. A slave camp system which exploited and maltreated millions of people behind barbed wire.

Information on and attacks on this barbaric system have been the main contents of the "smear campaign", for which we gladly assume responsibility. It has now been overwhelmingly proved that the "smear campaign" contained the truth, and that Land og Folk, as well as the Communist leaders, headed by Aksel Larsen, for years have systematically and with full knowledge twisted the truth about conditions in the Soviet Union under Stalinism.

UNITED STATES

N.Y. Times
JUN 5 1956

KHRUSHCHEV ON STALIN

This morning the newspaper publishes the full available text of Nikita S. Khrushchev's attack on Joseph Stalin. It is a searing experience to read that speech. Foul murder, base treachery, falsehood on an unprecedented scale, paranoia and egomania, all these are elements of the indictment Khrushchev brings against the man whom all Soviet citizens and Communist dupes the world over hailed not so long ago as "our father, our leader and our teacher." This speech must surely rank as one of the most dramatic documents of all time. It is a description of hell on earth in the land which millions of the naive once thought was rapidly becoming heaven or utopia.

Yet, after the initial shock of reading these revelations from the highest leader of world communism, a sense of satisfaction must pervade every opponent of communism these past decades. Here, from the Moscow heights themselves, comes full confirmation of all that we have believed about Stalin and the Soviet Union. The free world knew and said many years ago that Stalin was a murderer and monster in human form. Even two decades ago it was apparent that the blood of innumerable innocent victims had stained his hands indelibly. Khrushchev's speech enlightens us only on details. The essence was apparent to every intelligent citizen of the free world long ago.

Khrushchev's speech was both an act of catharsis—forced by the demands of the Soviet people who were Stalin's victims for long years—and a preparation for the future. It is a

prime example of the "cult of personality" in reverse. Yesterday Stalin was "the greatest genius of all time and all lands." Today he is an unspeakable fiend responsible for all that was horrible in Soviet history. The purpose is plain: to exculpate Stalin's closest associates, who have now succeeded him. By this act Khrushchev hoped to wipe clean the bloody slate of the past and to focus on a dead man the Soviet people's justified demand for vengeance.

The device is a transparent one. It should not be allowed to succeed. Khrushchev, Bulganin, Molotov, Malenkov and the rest were Stalin's own creatures and associates. They rose to their present position by executing his orders unquestioningly. They themselves proved their prowess as purgers and murderers time and again. Their hands are also stained with blood, and history still requires that they appear as defendants before the Soviet people.

The need to recognize the guilt of the present Soviet leaders is especially important because Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin is too narrow and leaves the door open for new horrors tomorrow. It is Stalin, the monster who murdered honest Communists and endangered Soviet power, that Khrushchev exposes. But murder and terror are not repudiated. Khrushchev lauds the use of these instruments by Lenin "against actual class enemies." Here we have the answer for all who may harbor new illusions about a new birth of democracy and freedom in post-Stalinist Russia.

The essence of the matter is that the real defendant before the bar of history is not Stalin or the Stalinist group. The real defendant, the real

culprit is the Communist ideology itself, the belief that a better world can be brought into being by traveling a road littered with the corpses of those who have different ideas. Stalin and his crimes were the logical product of the belief that the end justifies the means. Khrushchev's indictment testifies eloquently to what has been proved time and again in human history: the means determine the end. The sincere Communists whom Stalin murdered were the logical successors of the Social Revolutionaries, the Social Democrats, the kulaks and other dissidents whom Lenin murdered.

One other facet of the matter deserves thought. We now have Khrushchev's word for Stalin's paranoia and his crimes at home. But what of Stalin's crimes abroad? What of the Eastern European lands whose freedom was so ruthlessly snuffed out after World War II? What of the naked aggression in Korea in 1950? Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin is the best possible proof that our fears of Soviet aggression were justified these past years. If Stalin plotted against his closest associates, how much more must he have plotted against the free world, whose very existence was a permanent threat to his power? The answer is plain. The Soviet Union was responsible for a decade of cold war and international tension. And since Stalin's pupils still rule it would be folly to relax our guard. Stalin, after all, also spoke at times in soft tones and with kind words. The lesson of his hypocrisy while he lived is a useful one to remember as we deal with the men he trained and elevated to power.

Wash. Post
JUN 6 1956

The Pillars of the Temple

Certainly the text of the Khrushchev speech as released by the State Department constitutes one of the most startling and important historical documents of the 20th century. This is true even though the paper as made available here is almost surely a shortened and perhaps softened version of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin before the All-Soviet Congress of the Communist Party in February. The speech is essentially a brief for the defense—meaning the position of Khrushchev and his colleagues in the present "collective leadership." It constitutes, not a repudiation of terror as such, but a condemnation of terror wrongfully used; and it omits mention of some of the worst crimes committed under Stalin, such as the annihilation of the Baltic republics and the Katyn massacre. Nevertheless, it manages to paint an almost unbelievably savage picture of Stalin, far more devastating than even the early account of the speech had made out.

This remarkable indictment confirms and even amplifies the testimony of a long list of prominent Soviet defectors, including Barmine, Krivitsky, "Orlov," Kravchenko, Gouzenko and Khokhlov, concerning the character and methods of the repression throughout the quarter century of Stalin's ascendancy. Indeed, about the only allegation which Khrushchev neglected to echo is that Stalin had been in prerevolutionary days a secret agent of the Tsarist Okhrana, or political police, and a pupil and protégé of the notorious Malinowski. The portrait of Stalin drawn by Khrushchev for the doubtless pop-eyed delegates is that of a megalomaniac and paranoid monster—a sort of composite of Caligula and Genghis Khan but with his opportunities for cruelty and terror immeasurably enhanced by modern technology.

The numerous counts in the indictment cover Stalin's usurpation of supreme power in party and state; his tactics in the preliminary struggles against both Left (Zinoviev, Kamanev, etc.) and Right (Rykov, Bukharin, Tomsky, etc.) party oppositions; the assassination of Kirov and the tremendous purges that followed; the wholesale and systematic use of torture to exact confessions from the innocent; the demoralization of the Red army by the murder of Marshal Tukhachevsky and other high-ranking commanders and by the decimation of its officer corps; the mismanagement of the "patriotic war" and the bungling interference with military operations; Stalin's curious trust in the nonaggression pledge of another dictator—Hitler—and his panic and hysteria during the advances of the Nazi armies; his postwar fabrications of history to give himself sole credit for the final victory and to deprive such army commanders as Zhukov of their

merited glory; the breach with Tito, who Stalin thought would fall with a shake of his "little finger"; and the renewal of the terror as exemplified in the purges at Leningrad and in Georgia and in the fantastic "doctors' plot." There is even a report that the original version of the speech included condemnation of the Korean war—though any such suggestion is conspicuously absent in the document at hand.

Khrushchev does very little to clarify the relation of these later incidents to the struggle for survival and succession that must even then have been taking place in the Kremlin hierarchy. He merely asserts that among those marked for extermination by the sick, senile and suspicious Stalin were such remaining Old Bolsheviks as Molotov, Mikoyan and Voroshilov. Elsewhere in the speech, however, Khrushchev gives a ~~number~~ two of evidence in support of the rumor, widely circulated in the Western world, that the murder of Kirov was actually contrived by the secret police to provide Stalin with the appearances of a crisis and a pretext for destroying all past or potential party adversaries. And the mention of Stalin's supposedly intended additional victims in turn has given new currency to the suspicion that the tyrant, instead of dying a natural death, may have been murdered by some of the present crew in self-defense.

Although Khrushchev is at pains to assert that the horrors of Stalinist rule were made possible through the complicity of the secret police and above all by the arch-traitor Beria, he also makes an oblique effort to implicate his own rival Malenkov in the crimes of Stalin. Here Khrushchev is playing a dangerous and desperate game; for though Malenkov, who had been Stalin's personal secretary, is certainly vulnerable, so is Khrushchev himself. As all the delegates knew, Khrushchev had been Stalin's faithful satrap in the Ukraine. Khrushchev must have known, too, that in demolishing the Stalin myth so carefully fabricated by a whole generation of obedient propagandists including himself, he was also endangering the entire Communist mystique, not only in Russia but everywhere in the world. For from the repudiation of a charismatic and infallible leader it could be but a step to disenchantment with a charismatic and infallible collectivity.

It is therefore a reasonable postulate that Khrushchev's speech—despite the vehemence so reminiscent of the enthusiasm with which the terrified comrades were recently denouncing friends, relatives or associates who had fallen under Stalin's suspicion or disfavor—may not have been altogether spontaneous. Perhaps it is not too much to surmise

hat the denunciation of Stalin was forced upon him as part of the price of continued party leadership. Who, then, may have forced it? There may be some illumination in a prophetic passage from a study of Stalinism written a decade or more ago by two anonymous Germans who as former Communists had lived long in Moscow with opportunities to observe the dictatorship at close hand. Using the single pseudonym of Ypsilon, they wrote:

Stalin's dictatorship rests on three supports: the NKVD, the army and the unorganized but very influential group of industrial managers. This equilibrium can be maintained only by Stalin's hands, for he is their creator and their common example. Each successor of Stalin will have to reestablish the balance upset by the vacuum left by the death of the omnipotent. No successor will be able to do so, for a new totalitarian leadership will have to be imposed and reimposed on the other two . . . The heir will have to fight for his inheritance.

Malenkov, who had constituted himself the champion of the managers, made his claim only to be deposed. Beria, who commanded the vast and dreaded police apparatus, attempted his *coup d'état*, failed and was destroyed. The power of the secret police was thereupon broken, and with it one of the main props of the old dictatorship. Is it not likely that whoever may now attempt to claim the heritage—be it Khrushchev personally or the amorphous "collective leadership"—can do so only with the approval and help of the army leaders? Is it not likely, further, that they will give this support on their own terms, which include vengeance for their past injuries and humiliations? Is it not even possible that they will, in the end, demand the inheritance for one of their own? "Give me a sword!" cried the Abbé Siéyès in 1793. He found the sword, but it was Bonaparte's.

Wash. Evening Star

JUN 5 1956

Darkness All Day

The text of Nikita Khrushchev's sensational anti-Stalin speech reads, in large part, like something extracted from Arthur Koestler's "Darkness at Noon" or George Orwell's "1984." Although it probably is an abridged version, and although the State Department does not vouch for its authenticity, there is little reason to doubt that it says essentially the same things as were said last February to the Moscow Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

As far as substance goes, the charges made in the speech have been known to the world for many weeks past. But the text greatly increases the original impact of the story. For the statements attributed to Mr. Khrushchev (he has yet to deny them) add up to as damning an indictment as anybody could deliver against Josef Stalin and the terrible decades of his one-man rule. Here we have a spine-chilling picture of a tyrant gone berserk with power—a supremely vain and evil man, a psychopath of the worst kind, who imposed a reign of terror on all of Russia. His will was law, and to carry it out he resorted unrestrainedly, and at times insanely, to lies, plots, counterplots, torture, blood purges, absolute oppression and merciless mass murder. And he came close to wrecking his country with his military judgments and decisions, including his refusal to listen to advance warnings against Hitler's attack.

When he told this story to the secret Moscow session last February, Mr. Khrushchev merely confirmed what most free men had assumed for a long time before that. But he did not answer—nor does the purported text of his speech—a number of big questions that still puzzle even the best of our Soviet experts. He has failed, for one thing, to explain why he and Russia's other new "collective

leaders" apparently did nothing to restrain Stalin but instead acted as his most fawning sycophants until the day he died (or was he murdered?). He has suggested that they were all too terrified by the man, but this is hardly explanation enough to absolve them of their own large measure of guilt for all that happened under his rule excepting the Korean aggression. But has anybody made clear as yet why these men have decided to undertake an large and so risky a task as Stalin's de glorification from synthetic divinity to unspeakable devil.

Director Allen W. Dulles of our Central Intelligence Agency has said that this decision has been motivated only in part by the Kremlin's desire to acquire international respectability. The major reason for it, in his view, is that Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues have found it expedient, and perhaps imperative, to placate a large body of anti-Stalinists at home, and to that extent the development may mark the start of a significant liberalizing trend. But still, all of us had better keep in mind Mr. Dulles' warning that "the final and real test of the Soviet leaders will remain their willingness to accept those basic institutional changes that can give the Russian people and the world in general genuine assurance that a one-man or three or four-man dictatorship cannot again plot in secret the massive domestic and international crimes" of Stalin's day.

As matters stand, such institutional changes—including particularly the creation of opposition parties, an independent judiciary and a free press—seem as remote as ever in the Soviet Union. Accordingly, unless or until they take place, the free world must continue to reckon with a dangerous Russian tyranny. The de glorification of Stalin has yet to alter that fact in the slightest. There is still darkness all day long in the Red empire.

G.S. Mealter

JUN 6 1956

The Villain Is More Than One

The text of the Khrushchev speech to the Communist Party Twentieth Congress debunks Premier Joseph Stalin's continuing the evil picture the Western world has long had of the Soviet dictator and adds some darker tones of its own. The world now has from a Kremlin source an even fuller indictment for cruelty, deceit, and mass murder than has previously been drawn by refugee servers.

But what is to be done? Since, stands count. The general thought is of a conspirator for years, and a Russian who ed on the execution of his subjects while sounding his victims in millions. And as punishment he is to be exposed and branded in history by those who did his bidding and now inherit his power.

But is it enough to explain the mass starvations, deportations, tortures, purges, forced confessions, slave labor, and executions of more than three decades of Communist rule as merely the work of one madman who now is gone?

To accept this theory would be to conveniently personalize responsibility for the faults of a system. The abuses, however much they may have been heightened by the ambitions, the "rudeness," and the sickly suspicions of Stalin, have a broader use than his personality alone.

When Czar Nicholas II was overthrown during World War I there was for some months a hope that a moderate parliamentary government under Alexander Kerensky might emerge. But this fell because it mis-

judged the war-weariness and land-hunger of a long-oppressed population, to whom the "Bolsheviks or Communists" appeared with weapons and promises.

Thus, the war-weariness and land-hunger of a long-oppressed population, to whom the "Bolsheviks or Communists" appeared with weapons and promises.

But can a system which built itself on hatred for all owners of wealth and envisages its success only in their destruction—any more than a system which fawns on wealth and disregards human beings—escape for long the violence generated by its own character?

The successors to Stalin seem to have forsworn the use of force against each other, as indicated by survival of Malenkov after demotion. Yet there is the Beria episode. Can a minority clique, ruling by force, determine priority within its ranks by sweet persuasion?

Whatever answer the future may hold to that question, the free world now may judge further developments in the Soviet Union with confidence that it was not mistaken as to the character of proletarian dictatorship as exemplified under Stalin.

N. Y. N. Y.
JUN 5 1956

From Stalin to Khrushchev

The first thing about Nikita S. Khrushchev's marathon denunciation of Stalin at last February's twentieth party congress of the Communists in Moscow, which now emerges in textual detail, is the fury of accusation. Stalin, according to Khrushchev, was a murderer, an ignoramus, a military bungler who practiced "intolerance, brutality and abuse of power." The departed dictator, in short, was a maniac who almost brought his country to ruin.

All of it makes fascinating reading—how Stalin's "terroristic methods against honest Soviet people" made even the top officials fear for their own lives, how Stalin liquidated his fellow-workers, including such "eminent party and government leaders as Kossior, Rudzutak, Elke, Postyshev, Voznesensky, Kuznetsov and Rodionov," how he tortured the innocent, how this power-mad individual developed "the cult of the individual."

Whether this is the full story no one can be certain. Perhaps Mr. Khrushchev knows a good deal more, and maybe not all of it has to do with Stalin. The new Communist party boss was, after all, in full knowledge of what he now castigates. He was in the inner circle, which makes him an accomplice.

But Mr. Khrushchev is now eagerly engaged in trying to write all this off. It is a massive undertaking to revile everything that has gone before, to put all the blame on a dead man, and to try to sell the world on the argument that virtue and justice have come to the U. S. S. R. under Khrushchev's collective dictatorship. And it is quite evident that the Red salesman knows this. He is letting things get out gradually. First there was the big secret speech more than three months ago, then the progressive revelations of Stalin's downgrading followed by the controlled circulation of the speech itself (doubtless carefully edited) among the satellite countries and the party faithful elsewhere.

In a free country, obviously, such astounding news would be known to all at once. But in the land of the Soviets people are told only what their masters want them to know. Certainly they weren't informed about Stalin, and even

now they are getting the Khrushchev version only in controlled doses. But this is the way the system operates behind the Iron Curtain. Dictatorship exists because it dictates, and if things were any different there wouldn't have been any Stalin or Khrushchev either.

The plain fact is that the system spawned Stalin, and the only change now is the transfer of power from one man to a very few. About all that Mr. Khrushchev contributes is that Stalin was stupid in the exercise of his power. It was simply that the old boss killed off the wrong people and in his egocentric delusions shaped the wrong policies. The burden of complaint is that Stalin's repression went too far and was bad for the party. Nothing is said about the senselessness of terror itself, and Mr. Khrushchev is notably silent about the Radek and Zinoviev-Kamenev trials and the mass purges of peasants. To bring the chronicle up to date, it was only last week that news came from Azerbaijan of the execution of ex-Premier Bagirov and three other high-ranking Communists as counter-revolutionists. That was the way "justice" operated under Stalin, too. But it never seems to have occurred to the new Soviet management that anything was fundamentally amiss, then or now.

In the Khrushchev view, the trouble was operational, what with Stalin almost losing the war, needlessly rolling Tito and finally becoming so jealous and crotchety that he was about to extinguish physically some of the Politburo. The wonder here is that somebody didn't beat Stalin to the draw, and who knows but what this is not the accurate version of the dictator's end?

For all of Mr. Khrushchev's enraged breast-beating, there is only one conclusion to draw. The system of repression produced Stalin, and it is still just as capable of producing another. For all of the surface sweetness and light, mixed in with the Soviets' mounting economic and political offensive around the world, there has been no essential change. This is a graphic picture of the Soviet world at work. It gives the free world a renewed opportunity to show forcefully the difference between freedom and tyranny.

TIME, JUNE 18, 1955

THE KREMLIN

Discrimination in a Tomb

Moscow went all out last week to welcome Comrade Tito, the prodigal son, and for one very good reason. For them, at this moment in history, he was the world's most useful man. These days the Kremlin's Communists have one basic task on their minds: they hope, by pinning responsibility for Communist crimes of the past 20 years on Stalin, to exculpate themselves from a guilt which they unquestionably shared. They do not seem to care how Khrushchev's exposé affects foreign Communist leaders who—living under no "reign of terror" in their own countries—had no excuse for their slavish subservience to Stalin's will (see below). Instead, the Kremlin turned to the one surviving European Communist leader with a certified anti-Stalin record: Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito. In the Kremlin's new reckoning, Tito was a "cleanskin" who could persuade neutralist and socialist governments, and waverers in NATO and SEATO, that the Soviet change of heart is genuine.

Champagne & Cokes. Elaborately courted in Moscow last week, Tito was exploiting his singular advantage with evident satisfaction. In the conference room at the Council of Ministers building, the customary huge portrait of Stalin had been removed in order that Tito should not be offended. Marching sternly through the Lenin-Stalin mausoleum in Red Square in his powder-blue marshal's uniform, Tito ignored the sarcophagus of Stalin, gave a passing glance to that of Lenin. His 5 ft. wreath was marked "To Vladimir Ilyich Lenin" from "Josip Broz Tito." At a workers' meeting at the Moskva Auto Works (formerly the Stalin Auto Works), he said that after an absence of ten years he was glad to meet some people who were not afraid to look him in the eye and speak up.

At luncheons and receptions in the most ornate halls of the Grand Kremlin Palace, surrounded by grinning, handshaking Russian bureaucrats and bemedaled officers of the Kremlin guard in gold-braided green uniforms, Tito contrived to look unimpressed. His handsome, dark-skinned wife Jovanka outshone the dowdy official Russian wives with her wardrobe of elegant evening gowns of white silk, black lace over bronze-red, her red stole, gold mesh bag and rubies, and her day suits of pink brocade and lavender silk. At the ballet Tito looked bored.

Walking out from his Moscow residence in a cream suit and white snap-brim hat, with his wife, Tito pointed out the house in Pushkinskaya Street where he lived in the '30s, paid a visit to the famed Lux (renamed Excelsior) Hotel, longtime head-

quarters of the Comintern, from which hundreds of foreign Communists were dragged in midnight raids during the great purges. Taking refuge from crowds of gaping Russians in an ice-cream parlor, Tito ordered champagne and cakes.

He was shown an atomic reactor which Premier Bulganin said was "similar to the one we are making for you." At Leningrad his train was mobbed as crowds broke police lines. Tito put on his man-in-the-street act, tucked children under the chin, and listened to extravagant compliments paid to him by Premier Bulganin who, just as eloquently a few years earlier, had referred to him as a "jackal."

Perhaps the sweetest of Old Balkan Hand Tito's satisfactions was the vengeance he was taking on the men who had spoken loudest in denunciation of him during his 1948 quarrel with Stalin. Satellite leaders who once denounced him have been shoved aside, or tremble in their jobs. Men who went to their deaths accused of trafficking with him have had their reputations posthumously "rehabilitated." The Cominform which expelled him has been dissolved. Molotov has resigned. All these things, Tito indicated, make for a good start, but he still has some names on his list. He has a score to settle with an old enemy, Hungarian Communist Boss Matyas Rakosi. And the Yugoslav party newspaper *Borba* has made clear Tito's displeasure with France's Maurice Thorez. Little Albania has not yet properly recanted.

Moscow needs Tito, and the price is high.

The New Role. For a long time the standard U.S. attitude has been that "Tito is too smart to get himself back into the bear's claws," and to let it go at that. A reappraisal is now needed. Obviously Tito is not willing to become a satellite again. But a new role is emerging for him in the Communist world—a role gratifying to his considerable ego and suited to his considerable talents.

Last week it was becoming clear what the Kremlin wants of Tito. It does not mean to destroy his independence, but to put it to use. Stalin's old cronies and legitimate heirs want Tito to vouch for them in the world of friendly but doubting nations of Europe and Asia, when the

full facts of Stalin's crimes become known. They want Tito as a kind of ambassador extraordinary among the neutral nations, selling the Kremlin line from a new stand, using his influence to reestablish what is now, or soon will be, wholly discredited.

What will Tito gain? Behind his lordly impassivity is there a dream of becoming the great ideological and organizational genius of the world Communist Parties, laying old leaders aside and restoring order in the confused and resentful ranks of the Italian, French, German and satellite parties, a dream perhaps of uniting the

world's Communist and Socialist Parties in some kind of new International?

Tito has already shown himself skilled in pursuing the direction Moscow now wants to take. He has found a way of talking to the outside world. He has kept a tight security rein on his country without some of the more flagrant severities of Moscow. It is true that he has botched the running of his economy; the peasants are still poor and dissatisfied. But in this he is no worse than the Russians (neither dares admit that the difficulty is in the system itself). And he has shown agility and a certain style in diplomacy.

But above all, Tito provides the Kremlin with a new opening to the West. The European Communist Parties outside the Iron Curtain have diminished everywhere except in France and Italy; and in these two countries, while they hold their strength, they are isolated and sterile. A new way of infiltrating Western Europe is needed—a way of bringing down the barriers that Stalin's madness erected against Russia. The active hostility of the Western world must be numbed; perhaps even the military resolution of NATO can be sapped. At the height of the cold war each side knew where it stood; now the Communists seek to blur distinctions, so that Moscow Communism fades imperceptibly into "Independent" Communism, which in turn fades imperceptibly into neutralism, so that in time the neutralist may be hard to distinguish from the indifferent antagonist. In all this blurring of attitudes, Tito is useful, and the old hacks are in the way.

If the Thorezes and Togliattis hold back and hesitate to discredit Stalin's memory too quickly, it is not because they hold Stalin's memory green, but because they fear that in the process they themselves may be effaced.

Inevitable Difference. A confident Tito announced in Moscow last week that "there are no longer any important problems to solve" between Russian Communism and Yugoslav Communism. In the Kremlin's lofty, alabaster-white, great Hall of St. George, a reporter drew Tito's attention to U.S. congressional threats to cut off U.S. aid to Yugoslavia. Said Tito, resplendent in his blue uniform: "It is not important. Our relations with the U.S. remain as before." But will they?

In the past the U.S. had been guarded in its trust of Tito, but generous with its money. Now that he was back in his old camp, with a certain stature of his own, he may not miss the dollars he will now lose. He knows that the U.S. will still find it necessary to talk to him and through him. But from now on, there will be an inevitable difference. Denying him dollars will itself solve little. A more fundamental response to Moscow's new calculated blurring of distinctions is to keep distinctions clear. Tito's return to Moscow is a useful first lesson: a Communist is a Communist.

Echoes of the Terror

Both halves of the world—the non-Communist and the Communist—shook under the impact of First Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's no-longer-secret speech to the 20th Party Congress (TASS, June 11), but, whereas the non-Communists quickly absorbed the information given by Khrushchev, the Communists this week were still reeling.

Even those who had reason to know the truth about Stalin's reign were nevertheless startled by Khrushchev's brutally direct account of such monstrous crimes as the deportation of millions of people from their homelands, the futile and meaningless killing of thousands of party intellectuals, and the hideous miasma of murder and mayhem around the Kremlin. So harrowing was Khrushchev's tale that the U.S. State Department (which had got the text from an undivulged source) debated on the value of releasing it, thinking that many readers might be moved to accept Khrushchev's picture of himself and other top Stalin aides as innocent men caught up in a web of terror against which there was no possible protest. What finally decided the release of the text was the fact that the speech revealed such a sordid picture of Communist intrigue that it could not but have a demoralizing effect on Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union. As it turned out, this was the wiser counsel.

The Hoodwinked. Most of Europe's top Reds were in Moscow when the speech was made to the Party Congress last February, and (though barred from the secret session for Russians only) had read

it in transcript. On returning to their own countries they remained silent about it, while inaugurating piecemeal efforts to downgrade Stalin. Last week, as large slabs of the speech hit the front pages of non-Communist European newspapers, the storm broke over the heads of the cautious Communist leaders. Angry and confused, party members demanded to know what it meant.

For the first time in the history of the Italian Communist Party, Leader Palmiro Togliatti was caustically critical of the Moscow leadership, described Khrushchev's attack as "brutal and dangerous." Said another veteran Italian Red: "Khrushchev's speech was not Marxism . . . it was a personal tirade intended to relieve his feelings after years of bullying." As criticism grew, Togliatti announced an extraordinary series of regional conferences for reorientation of his huge party (2,130,000 members). He told the extraordinary meeting of the 110-man Central Committee that the word must be spread gently: Italian Reds would resent having been *baggerato* (hoodwinked). For the first time since his return from Moscow in 1944, Togliatti said the Soviet leadership are being criticized at cell meetings (and more openly, over time, classes at the corner *trattoria* after meetings).

In Paris, Communist Party Leaders Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos were also under fire for having failed to divulge any hint of the true nature of Stalin. But, fearful of losing their large following among French intellectuals, they still permitted (in a minor party publication) only mild criticism of Stalin "grown old." But perhaps the best example of the dilemma thrust on foreign Communists by Khrushchev's revelations was the bitter tears being shed by Manhattan's *Daily Worker* (see Press).

The Missing Hour. The 26,000-word released text, evidently a copy of the tightly edited version circulated among Soviet district organizers and some foreign leaders, was about one hour short of the full speech delivered by Khrushchev. Missing from the shortened version (but leaked from Moscow last March) was

Khrushchev's charge that Stalin had been anti-Semitic and had liquidated thousands of Soviet Jews. Nor was there specific mention in the transcript issued by the U.S. of the "murder" of Marshal Tukhachevsky and some 5,000 officers of the Red army prior to World War II.

Also absent from the edited dialogue was the voice of an unnamed delegate shouting from the hall, "Why didn't you kill him?" and Khrushchev's reply: "What could we do? There was a reign of terror." No mention was made, either, of the fact that, at Stalin's order, the elephantine

Khrushchev had once performed the *gopak*, a fast Ukrainian dance. Nor did the transcript record such homely touches as the cob-nosed Nikita in tears as he told of children being tortured, and the fact that 30 delegates had fainted and had to be lugged out of the hall.

But the most significant omission in the edited text was any reference to the effect of Stalin's terror on Soviet foreign policy. Last week Italian Communists were saying that a major portion of Khrushchev's speech was devoted to a searing attack on Stalin's conduct of international relations.

In the unpublished portion of his speech, say the Italians, Khrushchev charged that Stalin 1) needlessly destroyed international good will existing between the Soviet Union and her World War II allies; 2) deliberately planned and executed provocative measures like the Berlin blockade—which proved to be dangerous and humiliating failures, to boot; 3) ruthlessly deprived the Soviet people of the fruits of victory by forcing them to tighten their belts and concentrate on aggressive adventures and military preparations, including the production of outdated arms; 4) started the war in Korea confident that a walkover victory would be accepted by the U.S.; 5) recklessly exposed the Soviet Union to the grave danger of a global war and possible atomic attacks which the backward Soviet air force could have neither prevented nor retaliated.

The Khrushchev indictment means that Russia's entire postwar "peace" campaign was a sham, that Stalin was the aggressor in every cold-war episode. In Korea, said Khrushchev, "Stalin personally ordered the attack to begin." When word of all that gets out, Italian Communists are apt to feel even more *baggerato*.

Ten Days That Shook. In his welcoming speech at the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev had said: "The unity of our party was being built up during the years and decades. It grew and became stronger in the struggle with numerous enemies—the Trotskyites, the Bukharinites, the bourgeois nationalists and other inveterate enemies of the people . . ." But in his sensational last-day secret speech Khrushchev told the delegates that the phrase "enemies of the people" had been invented by Stalin to justify the liquidation of thousands, and that in the great purge the real Trotskyites *et al.* were so

few in number that they constituted no opposition.

It is a fair assumption that in the intervening ten days there was, in the upper party hierarchy, not a change of heart but a change of pace. Khrushchev, who

was clearly in agreement with the downgrading of Stalin, may not have wished to proceed as quickly as circumstance dictated. Study of the speech shows that, if Khrushchev's hand was forced, it was probably by the army cadres in the party. The version released by the U.S. State Department is full of ingratiating references to the Red army. Khrushchev confirms the fact that Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, hero of the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, was a Stalin victim. From the podium he calls down to Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky for confirmation of his story about Stalin planning military operations on a globe. His praise of Marshal Georgy Zhukov shows an artfulness in flattery such as no doubt helped reserve his life in the perilous heights of Stalin's side.

For students of Communist thought processes, the most interesting aspect of Khrushchev's speech is what might be called the Khrushchev Theory of Terror. Khrushchev approves of the terror employed by Lenin against the enemies and critics of the October Revolution ("Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases, when the exploiting classes were still in evidence"), and does not think the terror employed against the agents during the collectivization of the land worth mentioning. He abhors terror only when it is used against party members, against trades, and it is noteworthy that his set of investigators is examining Stalin's persecution of top party members.

In downgrading Malenkov and first Molotov he does not make Stalin's stake of physically liquidating them, though they are rudely and summarily posed of. But in the elimination of Khrushchev men in the security forces (Beria-ites) and Georgians loyal to the Stalin myth, he is showing himself merciless as his old instructor.

Own, but Still Breathing

In the familiar line of cold, grey faces in Lenin's cold, red tomb, watching the 1 Square parades pass by, one muscled figure was always seen quite close to Stalin. He was First Deputy Premier Leonid Brezhnev, onetime Lenin's apprentice who became an able

and ruthless administrator. Stalin was rumored to have married Kaganovich's sister Roza, though this has never been established as fact.

An Old Bolshevik, Kaganovich supported Stalin against Trotsky in the fight for power after Lenin died and was rewarded in 1930 with a Politburo seat and the first-secretaryship of the powerful Moscow Party Committee. It was in this job that he took under his political wing a mild-mannered and goateed young functionary named Nikolai Bulganin.

Always something of a maverick—he was the only Jew among top Soviet leaders to survive the purges—Kaganovich won Stalin's approval for his loyalty and toughness and got one top job after another. He played an important role in the party purges, was put in charge of the construction of the famed Moscow Metro, and finally he became czar of Russia's railroads, a job that he pursued with such vigor during World War II that he instituted the death penalty for failure to make trains run on time. With responsibilities came rewards: his home town was named after him; so were half a dozen cities throughout the Soviet Union.

After the war Stalin gave him the vital Ministry of Building Materials, then rushed him off to the Ukraine to put out fires of rebellion that the local party boss, another Kaganovich protégé, Khrushchev, seemed unable to handle. Later in Moscow, Kaganovich was placed in charge of labor.

Last week a two-paragraph item in *Pravda* reported that Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich, at his own request, had resigned his post as labor boss of Russia. His successor is Alexander Petrovich Volkov, chairman of the rubber-stamp Council of the Union, and a man so little known that the latest edition of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia does not even list him.

Thus, like two other Old Bolsheviks before him—Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan—Lazar Kaganovich, at 62, has lost his big job, but not his head. One by one the Old Stalinists are disappearing from sight so that two other Old Stalinists, Bulganin and Khrushchev, can get on with their story that the heirs of Stalin had nothing to do with him.

The New Leader

May 22, 1956

By Ferdinand Lundberg

THE VILLAIN IS THE PARTY

No single individual, not even Stalin, can be held solely responsible for the crimes committed and condoned by Communism over three decades

WHATEVER the inner reasons for the official degradation of Stalin by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—and these will become known only with time—the action is unquestionably of enormous significance for the world as a whole. It should, therefore, be carefully and continuously analyzed so long as analysis promises to yield illuminating conclusions.

Official Soviet policy now, it should be observed, is made suddenly, and startlingly, to harmonize with anti-Communist criticisms that held Stalin to be a criminal, paranoid who completely overshadowed Nero, Caligula, Torquemada, Ivan the Terrible and even Hitler. Communist official ukase Hitler, now, is shown to be no more than Stalin's apt pupil, a fact fully evident twenty years ago to the politically clear-eyed. Non-Russian supporters of Stalin, such as the members of affiliated Communist Parties and fellow-travelers, are now shown—officially—to be low IQ's politically, persons of fundamental ill-will, themselves borderline cases, or a combination of these questionable qualities. But this is of comparatively minor importance, especially for the future.

What is of greatest importance is the extremely revealing light the recent turn of events throws on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the chief vehicle of Kremlin conspiracy both internal and external. Stalin is dead. He was a single frail man who succumbed as rapidly as anyone else to disease or personal violence. Had he worked alone, Stalin could not have accomplished a tiny fraction of the evil for which he is now officially held responsible. He needed organized assistance, and an instrument, with which to send millions of his own people to death and to concentration camps and to conspire with Hitler for the unleashing of World War II against the peoples of the world. That instrument existed, ready to Stalin's criminal hand: the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

As should now be plainly evident, the leadership of the CPSU and its foreign affiliates is here today and gone to-

morrow. It is composed of malevolent shades, conjured up out of the illimitable Russian spaces. Not even the posthumous official reputation of the Party leadership is stable. The CPSU, the fact is, is an extremely volatile compound, liable to explode internally or externally in completely unpredictable ways. There is only one thing one can always say about this party: It never does anybody, least of all its managers, any genuine good.

Instead of heaping blame upon Stalin for past misdeeds, the world should now ask: What did the CPSU ever do to protect past leaders, Old Bolsheviks, and large sections of the Russian people from the prolonged and bloody Stalinist terrorism? This party, as everyone knows, did nothing to hinder vicious deeds, everything to promote them. It cannot protect its own official heroes, dead or alive. It cannot be relied upon by anybody.

The official degradation of Stalin also shows the world—redundantly perhaps—that the present Kremlin leadership, the creation of Stalin, will stop at nothing. Stalin, by means of propaganda and terror, had been made an integral part of the Soviet myth, a national hero, Lenin's beloved pupil. On the basis of all historical precedent, his reputation should have been held inviolate by the CPSU. Instead we see that party, under its present leadership, showing no compunction whatever about dragging his name, officially, in the mud. If Khrushchev and his associates are capable of doing this, and going to the great trouble of re-educating Stalin worshippers, what may one believe them incapable of doing? They will, it should be clear, be deterred by no scruple from serving their ends, whatever those ends may be.

The leadership in the Kremlin is completely flexible ideologically. If it suits its purposes, as the world now sees, it can turn against Stalin, who created this leadership and lifted its members from obscurity. And if it can, suiting its purposes, turn against Stalin it can also turn against Lenin, against Marx and Engels, against the whole of revolutionary history the CPSU claims to represent. Instead of extolling the working class (even as it tortures it), it can turn against it overtly. Claiming to stand for social change and progress, the Party, if it suits its immediate purposes, can turn against social change and

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progress. The Party, it is evident, can be made to stand for anything.

For to the CPSU and its leaders, everything is a tactic or is material for a tactic in the grand strategy of always building power. At bottom, and quintessentially, what the CPSU and its leadership stand for is nihilism. To this party, the corporate expression of nihilism, nothing whatever is valuable or sacred. Rightly named, the party would be called the Nihilist Party of the Soviet Union. For this party actually seeks—perhaps on an unconscious level—the annihilation of everything, including itself and its leaders.

The evil genius who created this party was Lenin, who now once again rules the Soviet Pantheon in cold and solitary splendor. What is politically wrong with Soviet Russia from a purely human point of view is, precisely, nothing more nor less than the Communist party, organized so as to place under central control a disciplined mass of depersonalized political robots in the form of party members. These party members, quite evidently, will mechanically do whatever is ordered and (what is worse) will believe whatever they are told to believe. They are, therefore, always completely and frighteningly sincere in carrying out orders. Promotion within the Party depends upon responsiveness to orders. Party members, in fact, are political soldiers, always engaged in political cold war manifold in its forms.

Until recently, the slightest questioning of the greatness of the now officially designated criminal lunatic, Stalin, was sufficient to bring dismissal from the robot ranks of the Party. Now, to doubt that the criminal lunatic was a criminal lunatic will instead bring dismissal.

Why, it may be asked, should anyone tremble, especially outside Russia, at the prospect of dismissal from the Communist party? In Russia dismissal, of course, is tantamount at the very least to being made permanently unemployed, without means of support. And it may mean much worse. But outside Soviet Russia, particularly in the free countries, dismissal cannot be so harsh in its effects. Why, then, should anyone be afraid of dismissal?

To understand this one must first understand that the Communist party, to those who sincerely believe in it, is thought to represent in a corporate form, and to guide them, all those tendencies in history that seem likely to promote the development of man to a level much higher than the world has yet seen. The party is the corporate expression of all that is valuable. In the service of this deal, any action whatever is justifiable. While the top leaders unquestionably no longer believe this, as Lenin probably sincerely did, the hard core of Party believers do believe it. In that sense, they are true Leninists.

While the true believer in the free countries is motivated basically by the vision here sketched, he also responds to orders partly from habit, partly because long service in the Party has deprived him of any individual initiative, and partly because he has learned his bridges to

non-Communist levels of society. He can no longer adapt himself to other than Communist forms of association.

The official degradation of Stalin, then, changes nothing fundamentally. The party that was Stalin's instrument, and without which he could not have operated, still stands. At its core are all the long-term spiritual Chekists who have supported it for years. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with its foreign affiliates, is organized for one fundamental tactic: combat, aggression, against any and all. While it does not rule out traditional armed aggression, it specializes in aggression insidiously carried out on cultural and social levels long before it is launched even on legal political levels. Using literature, philosophy, esthetic criticism, all the arts, oratory and journalism, the Communist party aims to shape in unobtrusive fashion people's attitudes and dispositions long before issues are even posed. With great pertinacity and at great expense in time, effort and money, it seeks in devious ways to condition responses long before the stimuli have been applied by the Party.

In the free world, the Communist party always disposes its forces so as to insure the maximum of social and political conflict, thereby insuring the maximum possibility of disruption. Communist party members march shoulder to shoulder in secret united fronts, from time to time, with representatives of every shading in the spectrum of belief. They are drawn, as by an invisible magnet, to every group that has a sense of grievance, whether its feeling of grievance is justified or not. Opposed (for its own inner reasons) to anti-Semitism in one set of circumstances, it will fight the fires of anti-Semitism in another set of circumstances. Pro-trade union in the free countries, wherever it seizes power it makes the unions instruments for converting workers into state peons.

The Communist party, as its history shows, has no creative power. It neither produces anything worthwhile nor does it promote the production of anything. Everything it touches it blights. It can only destroy, its friends as well as its enemies. Nihilistic throughout its being, it kills that which it formally loves as well as that which it formally hates. It really loves or respects nobody, not even Lenin, perhaps least of all Marx. It is, in the ultimate analysis, subject to no human control, but with the momentum gained in forty years of conscientiously contrived wickedness it impersonally controls its nominal controllers. Whether its leadership is now to be collective or whether a new Stalin will emerge, whether it formally stands for hostility or coexistence, whether it promises to be cooperative or not, makes little ultimate difference.

The party, one may be absolutely sure, will continue to generate and exude pure nastiness on a wholesale scale. In pure nastiness it can always be counted upon to exceed all production norms by large and increasing percentages. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the great institutional outlaw of all history. It represents a phase of history itself gone quite berserk.